It remains to be seen whether the three months to the regional elections that are due to take place in Colombia in October 2011 turn out to be the turning point in the government’s efforts to suppress the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and other leftist insurgents.
A key development in mid-2011 was the introduction of a new security policy by President Juan Manuel Santos. Unlike the Democratic Security policy of the administration of President Santos’ predecessor Alvaro Uribe (in which he served as defence minister), the new policy focuses on urban problems in general and the bandas criminales in particular.
The new policy coincides with three important new pieces of legislation. The Ley de Víctimas, which was promugated in June 2011, recognises the potential for monetary compensation to the families of around 4mn people killed and wounded by the insurgents since the 1980s (and by other protagonists such as rightist militias and rogue elements of the governments’ own forces). Importantly, the new law does not include official recognition of FARC. The Ley de Tierras, which was also promulgated in June 2011, provides for wholesale restitution of land to those families who were forced off their properties as a result of the conflict.
Given that one of the root causes of internal insecurity in Colombia is inequality in income distribution which is closely associated with inequality in land ownership, this law should have a very positive impact over the long-term. A third piece of legislation involves a dramatic reallocation of royalty revenues from minerals and energy in favour of resource-poor departments. Finance minister Juan Echeverry has said that half of royalty revenues will be applied to poverty reduction programmes; we see this as a favourable development as well.
Meanwhile, the new security policy also comes at a time that the Colombian government is placing more emphasis on strengthing diplomatic (and trade) ties with countries other than the US. During mid-2011, defence minister Rodrigo Rivera took part in discussions with the G-8 country leaders in Paris. More crucially, he undertook extensive negotiations with his Brazilian and Ecuadorean counterparts in relation to bilateral cooperation on the respective frontiers. The significance of the discussions with Brazil is increased by the investment and effort that that government is placing on boosting border security. The significance of the discussions with Ecuador is that that country now appears to be far less hospitable territory to any elements of FARC that remain. It is only about three years since diplomatic links between Ecuador and Colombia were broken as a result of an attack by the latters’ armed forces on a major FARC base in the former.
As a result of that attack, the Colombian government came into possession of the data files of a member of FARC’s top leadership, who had been killed in the fighting. The data files were turned over to the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), who published a comprehensive report on them in May 2011. The IISS conclusion, with which we agree, is this: while the files clearly show a high (if variable) level of cooperation between FARC on one hand and the governments of Ecuador and Venezuela on the other), it appears unlikely that the administration of President Santos will say or do much now. Essentially, too much trade, and a vast improvement in relations (especially between Ecuador and Colombia) are at stake.
A casual glance at the headlines how FARC (and, to a lesser extent the National Liberation Army – ELN) has been actively campaigning through mid-2011, undertaking kidnappings and borrowings. In the recent past, the violence has been increasing, not decreasing. In part, this is due to a desire to disrupt the local elections that are due to take place in October 2011. According to the government, there is a high risk of election-related conflict (kidnappings, bombings and ‘hit and run’ attacks on the army) in over one quarter of Colombia’s 1,100 or so municipalities. It is also possible that the increased violence reflects desperation on the part of FARC, which realises that it is losing its war.
Since former President Uribe came to power in 2002, FARC has lost about half of its fighters, who have been killed or captured or who have deserted the cause. In early June 2011, defence minister Rivera claimed that the army had killed Alirio Rojas Bocanegra, who had reputedly been Chief of Staff to FARC leader Alfonso Cano. Press reports in mid-July 2011 indicated that the airforce had attacked a suspected FARC munitions factory in Arauca, near the Venezuelan frontier.

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Executive Summary 5
SWOT Analysis 7
Colombia Security SWOT 7
Colombia Defence Industry SWOT 8
Colombia Political SWOT 8
Colombia Economic SWOT 9
Colombia Business Environment SWOT 9
Global Political Outlook 10
Global Hotspots: Libya, Iran, Afghanistan, Korea, Greece 10
Table: Election Timetable 14
United States 17
Latin America 17
Western Europe 18
Russia And The Former Soviet Union 19
Middle East And North Africa 20
Asia 22
Wild Cards To Watch 24
Latin America Security Overview 26
Economic 26
Key Factors To Consider In The 2010s 27
Security Risk Analysis 30
BMI’s Security Ratings 30
Table: Latin America Security Ratings 30
Table: Latin America State Vulnerability To Terrorism Ratings 30
Colombia’s Security Risk Ratings 31
City Terrorism Rating 32
Table: BMIs’ Americas City Terrorism Index 32
Political Overview 34
Domestic Politics 34
Long-Term Political Outlook 36
Domestic Security Overview 41
Internal Security Situation 41
External Security Situation 42
Armed Forces And Government Spending 44
Armed Forces 44
International Deployment 44
Market Overview 45
Arms Trade Overview 45
Industry Trends And Developments 46
Procurement Trends And Developments 46
Industry Forecast Scenario 48
Armed Forces 48
Table: Colombia’s Armed Forces, 2002-2008 (‘000 personnel, unless otherwise stated) 48
Table: Colombia’s Available Manpower For Military Services, 2008-2015 (aged 16-49, unless otherwise stated) 48
Defence Expenditure 48
Table: Colombia’s Government Defence Expenditure, 2008-2015 49
Table: Colombia’s Defence Expenditure Scenario – Changing % Of GDP, 2008-2015 (US$mn) 49
Defence Exports 50
Table: Colombia’s Defence Exports, 2008-2015 (US$mn) 50
Table: Colombia’s Defence Imports, 2008-2015 (US$mn) 51
Table: Colombia’s Trade Balance, 2008-2015 (US$mn) 51
Macroeconomic Forecast 52
Table: Colombia - Economic Activity, 2008-2015 53
Company Profile 55
Industria Militar (Indumil) 55
Country Snapshot: Colombia Demographic Data 57
Section 1: Population 57
Table: Demographic Indicators, 2005-2030 57
Table: Rural/Urban Breakdown, 2005-2030 58
Section 2: Education And Healthcare 58
Table: Education, 2002-2005 58
Table: Vital Statistics, 2005-2030 58
Table: Employment Indicators, 2001-2006 59
Table: Consumer Expenditure, 2000-2012 (US$) 59
Table: Average Annual Wages, 2000-2012 60
BMI Methodology 61
How We Generate Our Industry Forecasts 61
Defence Industry 61
City Terrorism Rating 62
Table: Methodology 64
Sources 65
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