Impact of the EU Industrial Emissions Directive on UK power supply

Introduction

The EU is consolidating its emission legislation into an over arching directive. This will lead to the closure of 10GW of power generation and more will potentially follow. The timing is poor as a difficult winter forced the power industry to consider re-opening coal power stations and calling on interruptible contracts to meet spiking demand, but is this directive as damaging as it appears?

Scope

*Analysis of new EU legislation that has been implemented to reduce emissions in the power generation sector.

*Insight into the industry's concerns about this new legislation and how they plan to respond to a threat to the industry

*Forecasts of UK power supply Vs power station decommissioning. Highlights whether the UK still risks a supply crunch by 2015

*An Overview of the options available to the UK in response to EU directives and how the industry should be better prepared in future.

Highlights

Revised EU directives threaten the future of coal in UK since the LCPD intends for all coal power stations still operational after 2015 to be deemed environmentally acceptable.

LCPD version 2 places serious strain on existing supply capacity and heightens risk of a power deficit, but Drax is the key to 2015's supply crisis. If it opts in to LCPD 2, an energy supply crisis could be averted.

The UK has sufficient new generation coming online before 2015 to avoid a supply crunch therefore a reprieve is unnecessary for the UK's security of supply and undermines the IED's purpose

Reasons to Purchase

*Understand the growing role of the European Parliament in managing and co-ordinating efforts to achieve tough climate targets.

*Analyse the UK power sector and its interaction with EU legislation to develop a response to its projected changes.

*Formulate a strategic response to changing industry requirements and understand the new supply dynamics this will create.


Report Highlights

[Studien Infos ausblenden]

Overview 1
Catalyst 1
Summary 1
Methodology 1
Table of Contents 2
Table of figures 3
Revised EU directives threaten the future of coal in the UK 4
Overview 4
Assumptions 4
The LCPD directive was not comprehensive enough to reach the EU's 2020 emissions targets. 5
Europe's directives were an attempt to clean up its power sector, but too many details were found wanting 5
While the LCPD attracted new investment in the UK, an update to the directive has generated complications 6
A review of the LCPD Directive was Necessary to remove the weaknesses in the original version. 7
The LCPD 2 places serious strain on existing supply capacity and heightens the risk of a power gap 7
The UK power industry will suffer from the new directive, but is sufficiently well positioned to cope. 8
For years forecasts have suggested that UK will face a power crisis in 2015: is this true? 8
As the LCPD 1 encouraged investment in new generation, total projected capacity may suffice to avoid a crunch 10
Although the power sector's weaknesses will be laid bare a reprieve would be a mistake that would remove years from the UK's climate progress. 11
Power companies want the implementation of the IED to be delayed by four years in the UK, but is this justified? 11
The UK will be dependant on the very efficient development of new generation if Drax closes and nuclear is vetoed 12
Drax is the key to 2015's supply crisis: if it opts in to the LCPD 2, an energy supply crisis could be averted 13
Conclusion: 14
There are no grounds for a reprieve from the IED in the UK as security of supply is not at risk 14
APPENDIX 15
Ask the analyst 15
Datamonitor consulting 15
Disclaimer 15
List of Figures
Figure 1: The Implementation of the Large Combustion Plant Directive 5
Figure 2: Overview of EU Emissions Legislation 6
Figure 3: How ready is the UK for the LCPD? 8
Figure 4: Power generation projects currently underway 10
Figure 5: Forecast of new generation capacity vs expected decommissioned capacity (2009-35) 11
Figure 6: Scenario 1: installed capacity if Drax closes vs peak demand (2009-35) 12
Figure 7: Scenario 2: installed capacity vs peak demand (2009-35) 13

[Inhaltsverzeichnis ausblenden]