Iran’s current defence minister Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi talked in regional media in April 2011 about how important upgrading the country’s armed forces equipment is to the strategy of the defence ministry. The articles talk about how the country has become self-sufficient in various areas of military development and manufacture and about successful tests of new systems. The military manufacturing sector is centralised under the Defence Industries Organization (DIO) and the sector operates under severe international sanctions that greatly restrict both imports and exports. Reading between the lines, it is clear that some progress is being made by the indigenous defence sector but as for how much actual capability is being enhanced – it is difficult to tell.
Security issues do surround the development of nuclear facilities. Iran has had the support of Russia in building and testing nuclear plants for many years. Both countries claim that the work going on is purely to provide alternative energy for domestic consumption. Although this may sound odd from a country knee-deep in oil, there are some valid reasons why Iran should look for other sources of energy – not least because it is financially dependent on the export of oil and so using less of it domestically provides more potential exports.
Nuclear development puts the eyes of the world on the state. An important change in focus of the country’s military focus and strategy has been caused by the potential for either Israel or the US to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities for pre-emptive purposes. Although we see this as unlikely, it is by no means impossible to foresee. The US and the EU will continue to press forward with increasing economic sanctions and Iran will continue with its nuclear programme while seeking new economic and political allies.
Internally, Iran has some battles to fight too. The most effective armed opposition group is the People’s Mujahedin of Iran, known as the Mojahedin Khalq Organisation (MKO). Based in Iraq, it has launched highly effective offensives across the border and, at its peak, numbered some 6,000-8,000 troops. However, Iraq has publically reported that the MKO cannot continue to base itself there and in early 2011, claimed back a large part of the land on which the group’s base sat. There has been a distinct lack of recent activity from the group.
There is little to say about the importing and exporting of arms and equipment by Iran at the present time. Where small areas of trade do exist, such as with Russia, they are being condemned by much of the Western world to such an extent that even the Russians are buckling a little under international pressure to cease any military-type trade with Iran.

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Executive Summary . 6
SWOT Analysis 7
Iran Security SWOT . 7
Iran Defence Industry SWOT .. 7
Iran Political SWOT 8
Iran Economic SWOT . 8
Iran Business Environment SWOT 9
Global Political Outlook .. 10
Japan After The Quake 11
Global Hotspots: Libya, Iran, Afghanistan, Korea 12
Wild Cards To Watch 16
Middle East Security Overview 18
Political Risk Analysis – The Strategic Outlook For The 2010s 18
The Middle East In A Global Context .. 18
Challenges And Threats To Stability And Security. 18
Regional Power Dynamics . 28
Nuclear Proliferation 30
External Powers.. 31
Scenarios For The Middle East 32
Security Risk Analysis . 34
BMI’s Security Ratings 34
Table: Middle East And Africa Defence And Security Ratings . 34
Table: Middle East And North Africa State Vulnerability To Terrorism Index . 35
Iran’s Security Risk Ratings .. 35
City Terrorism Rating .. 37
Table: BMI’s Middle East And North Africa City Terrorism Index 37
Political Overview 39
Domestic Security Overview . 41
MKO . 41
Kurdish Groups .. 41
Sunni Extremists . 42
Armed Forces And Government Spending . 43
Current Strength . 43
Historical Strength . 43
Equipment .. 44
International Deployments . 44
Weapons Of Mass Destruction . 44
Table: Background Brief – Iran’s Nuclear Programme, 2002-2009 .. 46
Delivery Vehicles 47
Market Overview .. 48
Arms Trade Overview .. 48
Industry Trends And Developments .. 49
Table: Key Players In Iran’s Defence Sector 50
Procurement Trends And Developments . 52
Industry Forecast Scenario 54
Armed Forces .. 54
Table: Iran’s Armed Forces, 2000-2008 (‘000 personnel) 54
Table: Iran Defence Personnel – Manpower Available For Military Services, 2009-2015 (aged 16-49) 54
Government Expenditure 55
Table: Iran’s Government Defence Expenditure, 2008-2015 . 56
Table: Iran’s Expenditure Scenario – Changing % Of Government Expenditure, 2008-2015 (US$mn) .. 56
Table: Defence Expenditure Scenarios – Changing % Of GDP (US$mn) .. 57
Defence Trade .. 57
Key Risks To BMI’s Forecast Scenario 57
Macroeconomic Outlook . 58
Table: Iran – Economic Activity, 2008-2015 59
Company Profiles 61
International Companies 61
China Great Wall Industry Corporation . 61
Sukhoi .. 62
Ulan-Ude Aviation Plant 63
Domestic Companies 64
Aerospace Industries Organization 64
Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group 65
Defence Industries Organization 66
Iran Electronics Industries. 68
Country Snapshot: Iran Demographic Data 69
Section 1: Population 69
Table: Demographic Indicators, 2005-2030 . 69
Table: Rural/Urban Breakdown, 2005-2030 70
Section 2: Education And Healthcare .. 70
Table: Education, 2002-2005 .. 70
Table: Vital Statistics, 2005-2030 .. 70
Section 3: Labour Market And Spending Power . 71
Table: Employment Indicators, 1996-2005 71
Table: Consumer Expenditure, 2000-2012 (US$) .. 71
Table: Average Annual Manufacturing Wages, 2000-2012 .. 72
BMI Methodology 73
How We Generate Our Industry Forecasts 73
Defence Industry . 73
City Terrorism Rating .. 74
Table: Methodology .. 76
Sources 77
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